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 The Future of Democratic Capitalism 
 
Introduction 
The current financial crisis and recession have been likened to the great 
depression. It has generated calls from world leaders for revising Democratic Capitalism 
by a much more interventionist government system. Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy 
said that we need to develop a new economic order that will assign to the state a much 
greater role in regulating industries and even nationalizing some, and President Obama 
has put some of these ideas into action by supporting a highly expansionist fiscal policy, 
including de-facto nationalization of icons of American industry, like General Motors, 
that may aim to change the nature of democratic capitalism, at least US style. More 
surprisingly, the current crisis has also generated some confusion among economists and 
a surprising revival of old Keyensian ideas that most macro economists, including Neo-
Keynesians, came to think of as anachronistic. Other economists, much more predisposed 
to free enterprise have approached the problem from a different angle by concluding that 
what’s wrong with capitalism is the capitalists. They must have made a big discovery: the 
market system is not motivated by benevolent players. 
I believe that much of the hoopla surrounding the doom and gloom prediction of 
the end of capitalism is misplaced. This is because paraphrasing Winston Churchill’s 
famous saying, "Capitalism [Democracy] is the worst form of an economic system 
[government], except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time". 1  
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So first, let me define what I mean by democratic capitalism: an economic system 
that promotes private enterprise, free markets, and free trade through the rule of law, and 
thereby encouraging capital accumulation in its broad sense: physical as well as human. 
The adjective “democratic”, refers to a system of government that promotes individual 
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, apart from wealth creation, thereby 
assuring that capitalism can also benefit from wide public acceptance which is necessary 
for its long-term survival.  
The emphasis on “human capitalism” represents an important twist on the concept 
of capitalism, since human capital is gradually becoming the widest form of capital 
owned by people, as education, training, and health, i.e., “embodied” human capital, 
spread across all segments of society. Both embodied human capital, which increases the 
productivity of human resources in current production, and “disembodied” human capital, 
or knowledge originating in the mind of researchers and entrepreneurs, which is 
transformed into process and product innovations, patents, books and other information 
outlets, are the genuine “engine of growth” that has fueled the unprecedented growth in 
per-capita income and wealth in the modern era. The relevance of human capital is bound 
to grow even more in the emerging “global information economy”, so the future of 
capitalism needs to be judged also in view of its success in promoting this essential form 
of capital, which puts people, rather than physical capital, at the center of the economic 
system. 
The first point I want to make about the current dire assessments of capitalism is 
that while the current recession has exposed new problems concerning the operation and 
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regulation of financial markets, the biblical proverb that “nothing is new under the sun” 
still applies to the current crisis.2  
As Robert Samuelson reminded me in one of his recent columns, Joseph Schumpeter, one 
of the 20th century’s eminent economists, believed that capitalism sowed the seeds of its 
own destruction. He said that the chief virtue of capitalism was long-term – facilitating 
wealth creation. But in the short term he saw capitalism marred by its flaws: 
unemployment, instability, inequality. These would make short-term politics fixate on 
anti-free market initiatives and question the legitimacy of capitalistic values – risk taking, 
self-enrichment – which are necessary for economic success. These values were not 
hailed just by Adam Smith. Deng Xiao Ping set China’s phenomenal economic takeoff on 
fire by declaring that “to be rich is glorious”. 
Schumpeter’s diagnosis of capitalism seems to be fully validated by the financial crisis 
and severe recession, except that he was wrong on his main prediction – that capitalism’s 
flaws would cause it to lose its vitality. The reality is that Democratic Capitalism has 
flourished despite episodes of depression, war, prohibition, and intrusive interventionist 
policies. It is therefore a mistake to engage in a critical assessment of capitalism while 
world economies are still close to the ebb of the business cycle. Free markets cannot 
abolish the business cycle in the same way that free trade and free capital flows cannot 
abolish investment bubbles. While we are at the depth of recession, it is hard to see light. 
But we should also have a better understanding of what caused the “tsunami” before 
blaming democratic capitalism and free markets of being its main culprits. This is what I 
try to summarize in section 1. In section 2 and 3, I will try to summarize the performance 
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of American capitalism over the last 150 years or so in terms of both promoting material 
growth and other welfare attributes. I will conclude with a short summary. 
1. Anatomy of the crisis  
Like other economists, I believe that the current economic contraction has its origins in 
the housing bubble promoted by federal policies and the major mortgage providers in the 
economy. This bubble has been stoked by an excessively expansionary monetary policy 
and a regulatory failure. The bubble has ultimately imploded, causing a contraction in the 
housing sector, a meltdown in the financial-intermediation market, and a severe 
recession. 
a. The role of Government mortgage providers: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
Born as a government agency in 1938 to support the mortgage market, Fannie 
Mae became a government sponsored enterprise (GSE), i.e. a private corporation, in 1968 
– to remove it from Fed balance sheet – with Ginnie Mae set up as a guarantor of 
mortgages. Freddie Mac was later added in 1970 to facilitate a secondary mortgage 
market. These two GSEs became the main players in the housing market controlling 50% 
of all mortgages. Initially these companies served as intermediaries between borrowers 
and lenders lubricating the operations of the credit market. But the initial success of these 
institutions was later used as a vehicle to serve public policy objectives lacking a solid 
economic foundation. The GSEs, through the federal Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA), were encouraged to make mortgage loans to people who couldn’t afford them, 
and which a private lending enterprise would eschew. In particular, mandates were placed 
on Fannie and Freddie requiring that the percentage of mortgages to be allocated to 
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households below median income should rise to 52% in 2005, and that the percentage of 
loans going to households with income in the four lower deciles of the income 
distribution should rise to 28% in 2008.  
b. The role of financial derivatives and regulatory agencies 
The mandate of the GSEs to engage in sub-prime lending has created an 
unprecedented demand for private residences and a strong upward pressure on real estate 
prices. The opportunity to profit from a bubbling real estate market created a bandwagon 
effect on private investment companies by enticing them to enter the mortgage-lending 
business and provide the necessary capital to finance sub-prime mortgages through 
mortgage-based securities (MBS) and related financial derivatives. One could also make 
the argument that private investors were willing to purchase such derivatives and issue 
subprime mortgages because they believed that if the housing market collapses, the 
government would bail out the GSEs as well as the private lenders. Financial innovation, 
like most technological innovations, which is usually a catalyst of economic growth, 
played in this case a key role in stoking the housing bubble. Investment banks, GSEs, and 
other lenders spread the inherent risk from mortgage transactions not just to the rest the 
domestic economy, but to the international economy as well through issuance of MBS 
and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), and these were snapped by investors who 
were not able to price them correctly. Insurance companies like AIG absorbed a huge part 
of that risk through the use of credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives. 
c. The role of the Fed 
A central factor explaining why the bubble had grown so big over so long a 
period was the expansionist monetary policy by the Fed.  Concerned about the potential 
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economic contraction created by the recession of 2001-2 following 9/11, the Fed 
embarked on a cheap money policy by lowering and maintaining short-term interest rates 
and their real level too low for too long a period. The cheap money made it irresistible for 
investment banks and insurers to take advantage of the short term profit opportunities. 
Moreover, most of these financial institutions did not fall within the regulatory 
framework of the “traditional” banking system. This has enabled excessive leveraging by 
these credit providers. Rating agencies also share the blame, partly because, like most 
other market players, they failed to assess correctly the value of the new financial 
instruments they were rating, and also because they were pressured to serve the demand 
for such securities by corporations they were dealing with.  
All these factors added up to a ticking time bomb which ultimately exploded 
when the Fed started raising the interest rate in June 2006 to combat possible inflationary 
pressures. As the prices of private residences and commercial real estate started to 
implode, the huge worldwide stock of MBSs, CBOs and CDOs became “toxic”. The 
inability of banks and other financial intermediaries to assess the multi-party risk inherent 
in financial transactions as a result of trillions of dollars tied up in toxic assets clogged 
the arteries of the credit market and created a severe credit crunch. Despite the huge 
injection of funds by the FED to bail out investment banks “too big to fail” and to 
provide liquidity through the discount window, the credit markets have so far remained 
largely frozen because of the uncertain values of the toxic MBS and the real estate assets 
they represent. This is the main factor that has inhibited the provision of credit for private 
investments, causing a general contraction in economic activity, employment, and 
consumption. 
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 The implication of this short anatomy of the crisis is that the current crisis has 
been brought about as much by Government intervention and the failure of regulation as 
by the failure of markets to correct. It therefore questions the argument that the way to 
correct the economic system is through a significant expansion of regulation of private 
enterprise and private markets. As George Stigler’s “capture hypothesis” has 
demonstrated, regulation is not a panacea: regulators often become proponents of the 
business interests they are supposed to regulate. So the best regulation may be the least, 
in order to insure its effectiveness where it is really needed, notably over the supply of 
money.  
2. Is Capitalism losing Its Vitality?  
The second point I would like to make is that since we are dealing with the future 
of capitalism, it is imperative to examine its long-term performance. In this context, I’d 
like to refer to a recent paper of mine, which illustrates the growth of the US economy 
over the 20th Century as a consequence of the accumulation of a type of capital not 
typically emphasized in the literature on capitalism – human capital. What I find is a 
resounding contradiction to Schumpeter’s view that because of its short-term flaws, 
Capitalism is losing its vitality. I will illustrate it via two significant historical 
developments over the last 150 years or so, which elevated the human condition at speeds 
unprecedented in human history.  
a. Continuous growth in productivity and per-capita income over 150 years 
In the early1800s the U.S. had levels of GDP and GDP per capita considerably 
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below that of the U.K. and it was not until 1872 for GDP and 1905 for GDP per capita 
when the U.S. overtook the U.K.  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the comparisons poignantly.3 
Abstracting from year-to-year and cyclical fluctuations, both the U.S. and U.K. graphs 
relating the logarithm of GDP or GDP per capita to chronological time appear over the 
long haul to resemble the shape of an upward-sloping straight line. The slope of each line 
represents the long-term annual growth rate of GDP or GDP per capita.  
Two points about these figures deserve special mention: 
z Both resemble straight lines from a distance, where the jagged fluctuations become 
blurred. The slope of each line is remarkably constant despite the fact that the period 
represented by the curves transcends the great depression, numerous milder business 
cycle fluctuations, two World Wars, the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and more recently 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Every time the curves exhibit significant deviation – drop or 
rise – from the long-term trend, they do rejoin it with remarkable regularity. What 
guarantees this remarkable stability of growth over the long haul? 
z The slope of the line for the US is steeper than that for the U.K. In other words, the 
U.S. has overtaken the U.K. because its long-term growth rates have been higher: 
Over the 132-year period 1871–2003 (starting at the point of overtaking) the U.S. 
versus U.K. GDP growth rates have been 3.39% versus 1.91% per annum while the 
corresponding per-capita GDP growth rates were 1.87% versus 1.42%.4 In recent 
decades, these gaps have narrowed. For example, over the period 1961–2003, the 
comparative growth rates of GDP in the U.S. versus the U.K. were 3.37% versus 
2.43%, while those for per-capita GDP were 2.25% versus 2.11%, respectively.5  
 
 10
b. Human Capital as the underlying engine of growth 
My basic thesis is that differences in long-term per-capita income growth stem 
primarily not from differences in physical stocks, including land or other natural 
resources, but from differences in the rates of growth of human capital. The reason is that 
if we apply the simple neo-classical growth mechanics to explain the dynamics of 
persistent growth, we would expect growth in per-capita income, or TFP, to come from 
technological innovations. But significant breakthroughs in technology occur discretely, 
sporadically and unpredictably. Yet the rate of growth of per-capita income shows a 
remarkable continuity and stability, as we just saw. Endogenous-growth theory ascribes 
such continuity to the continuous accumulation of human knowledge, i.e., to human 
capital accumulation.  
• Why human capital?  
As argued in a famous quote from John Maurice Clark, “Knowledge is the only 
instrument of production that is not subject to diminishing returns”. The secret here is 
that knowledge does not just augment current factors of production. As an embodied 
factor of production, knowledge should be subject to diminishing returns like hours of 
work or capital utilization. However, it also raises our capacity to learn and innovate. But 
the more important idea here is that human capital can grow persistently and smoothly as 
a result of deliberate investments a current generation makes in the knowledge and health 
of future generations. If we model the process in a dynastic or overlapping-generations 
setting, we can show that a steady state level of investment by parents in the human 
capital of their offspring that exceeds a critical threshold, guarantees a perpetual 
formation of human capital and growth. 
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• What accounts for differences in the rate of human capital formation and growth? 
By this thesis the US has taken over the UK because of a faster rate of accumulation of 
human knowledge and technological prowess. How did that happen? 
Recent research has shown that the US has had an advantage over Europe in two respects. 
It was the first to introduce formal schooling, stressing a uniform set of formal 
knowledge rather than vocational skills. This gave the US a tremendous advantage over 
Europe. What is less known is that the US was the first nation to develop a massive 
public system of tertiary education, starting in 1862, which gave the US a significant 
advantage over Europe throughout the 20th Century. But the US has achieved superior 
human capital formation not just by growing it domestically through a massive high 
school and tertiary education system, but by importing it as well, i.e., by encouraging 
immigration of skilled people, especially after the second world war. 
• Democratic capitalism as the underlying motivating factor 
Both human capital formation and its impact on growth, however, are ultimately 
attributable to underlying institutional and policy factors. The key motivating factor for 
generating the continuous growth of human knowledge is the reward knowledge 
formation is given within an economy. This has been the main source of strength of 
democratic capitalism generally and American capitalism in particular. The American 
education system has been more open and democratic than that of the relatively more 
elitist Europe. The American legal system has been relatively more protective of property 
and contractual rights, and more accommodating to free enterprise. The relatively freer 
labor and capital markets, in turn, have allowed markets to set proper rates of return on 
investment in education. And this has attracted not just domestic talent to pursue higher 
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education, but immigration of educated people from other countries who were attracted 
by the high reward for educational attainments set by the relatively free American labor 
market and the individual freedoms offered by the American democratic system. These 
underlying factors have encouraged a faster per-capita human capital accumulation, 
which enabled the US to overtake the UK and Europe combined and become the 
economic superpower in the 20th Century. 
3. Capitalism and human welfare 
A. Income distribution 
One argument typically taken against the Capitalistic system is that while it may be 
successful in growing human material wealth, the impact on human welfare needs to be 
assessed from other angles as well. One is income distribution. As Schumpeter put it, the 
capitalistic system also tends to produce greater inequality in the distribution of income. 
In other words, capitalism increases the disparity between rich and poor, which also 
increases social conflict and political instability. This is a serious objection, I believe, and 
one that should not be taken lightly. The problem is that the argument is questionable on 
several grounds, which again come from human capital theory.  
• First, inequality in wage earnings, and perhaps in non-wage income as well, comes 
overwhelmingly from differences in schooling and job training across persons. In 
other words, wage differences are largely the result of investment in human capital. 
By any fairness principle, people who invest more in human capital should be 
expected to get a return on their considerable investment in time and money. Free 
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market, free enterprise, and free trade – the 3 pillars of capitalism, simply 
accommodate this norm efficiently.  
• Also, extending this argument further, there is a statistical bias in measuring income 
inequality, since differences in observed income do not account for the opportunity 
costs of investment in education. It is well documented that differences in the present 
values of lifetime income across individuals are not as large as differences in current 
income. (This is despite the fact that educated people also live longer). 
• In recent work I published with Jinyoung Kim, we have also investigated the dynamic 
pattern of income distribution, and we show that it varies over different phases of 
economic development. It tends to increase during takeoffs from a stagnant 
equilibrium of low income into a persistent growth equilibrium, which is what China 
experiences today, but it then converges on a much lower level in the long run, even 
in the absence of government transfer payments and subsidies. Such trend in 
inequality is a necessary outcome of the development process.  
B. Human longevity 
Another measure of an economic system’s success are welfare indicators such as 
health and longevity. In this context, one needs only to point out the unprecedented 
growth in life expectancy over the last 150 years. To wit: 
• In the US, the earliest data are from 1850 in Massachusetts where life expectancy at 
birth was 38.3 for males and 40.5 for females. In 2005 these numbers rose to 75.2 for 
males and 80.4 for females. In other words, life expectancy pretty much doubled for 
both sexes. Several related features of this dramatic trend are worth emphasizing: 
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• The trends for non whites have been even more accentuated than those for whites 
over comparable periods (see Table 1-09). To wit: the percentage increases of life 
expectancy at birth for both sexes over 1970-2005 has been 14.20% for blacks, as 
opposed to 9.21% for whites. For black males the percentage increase was 15.83% as 
opposed to 11.32% for white males, while for black females the increase was 12.01% - 
almost double of the 6.88% for white females. 
• The trends reflect a genuine increase in longevity. In fact, in the second half of the 
20th Century the percentage increase in age-specific life expectancy has been rising 
continuously at all age groups, although at a slower pace. Specifically, from age 5 on, 
the percentage increase in life expectancy has become increasingly higher as age 
advances. The evidence is significant because it shows that life expectancy at birth 
has risen not just because of the drop in child mortality. The trends signify a real 
growth in human longevity (see Table 2). 
• The evidence from Hong Kong is even more dramatic than in the US over a 
comparable period. Over the period 1971-2005 the percentage increase of life 
expectancy at birth for both genders has been 14.16% for Hong Kong as opposed to 
9.89% for the US. For males the percentage increase was 16.2% for Hong Kong 
versus 12.07% for the US, and for females the increase was 12.22% in Hong Kong 
versus 7.63 for the US. I am tempted to quip here that Hong Kong has become more 
capitalistic than the US, but this would be unscientific.. At the very least, however, 
we could say that far from killing people, capitalism has allowed a dramatic 
improvement in human health and longevity, which included wide segments of 
society across different capitalistic countries. In fact, the empirical evidence shows 
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that the most systematic differences in life expectancy are attributable to differences 
in education, not income (see Table 4).  
At the same time, we know that access to medical services has not been equal under 
capitalism because of the increasingly higher price of medical services, which has been a 
primary reason for government intervention through the establishment of old-age support 
systems. Health is also a public good, as we witness during times of exposure to public 
health hazards like the SARS epidemic, Mad Cow disease or the current swine flu scare, 
which require the intervention of public health organizations. However, the more affluent 
capitalistic countries can more easily support necessary public intervention in situations 
where private markets fall short, as is the case with the provision of other public goods 
such as external and internal defense and the rule of law. But even in the case of these 
public goods, market-based solutions can improve the efficiency of government 
intervention.   
Conclusion 
Capitalism is clearly not a perfect economic system partly because it cannot overcome 
especially the short-term weaknesses underscored by Schumpeter. I would add to it 
another weakness that classical economists have not paid much attention to: free markets 
and free trade cannot eliminate crime, by which I mean not just felonies, but economic 
and white-collar crimes ranging from bureaucratic corruption, fraud, embezzlement, and 
corporate crimes, including managerial abrogation of fiduciary responsibilities to 
corporate shareholders and stakeholders. While Adam Smith was aware of the problem, 
he has not emphasized it believing, perhaps, that competitive markets can diminish the 
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problem. Some of these imperfections can also contribute to the severity of business 
fluctuations, as in the present recession. What I was trying to argue in the preceding 
sections, however, is that the historical evidence of the last 150 years or so indicates that 
the system has performed reasonably well, not just in terms of material wealth, but also in 
terms of other welfare indicators. The demise of the socialist economies of the Soviet 
Block in the last century highlights this point. In a historical perspective an objective 
assessment might conclude that, as an economic system, capitalism has done more for 
humanity than any systems tried from time to time. 
Whether capitalism is likely to lose its vitality, however, remains an issue, especially if 
some of the reforms espoused by current world leaders will severely weaken the principal 
social norm underlying capitalism: its acceptance as a fair system. Increased regulation, 
like excessive taxation, chips away at the profit motive that fuels entrepreneurship, and 
government bailouts of failing corporation create moral hazards that can destabilize the 
capitalistic system. But capitalism is not a static system. It has built-in adaptive attributes 
because markets, including the political market under democracy, find ways to overcome 
excessive interventions. American capitalism has survived increased levels of 
government intervention in the economy – from the introduction of personal and 
corporate income taxes, to the institution of Federal Commissions on Trade, Securities 
and Exchange, Transportation, Communication, and Environmental Protection, partly 
because at least some of these interventions have actually strengthened the efficiency of 
markets, and partly by abolishing the most inefficient ones, like the price controls of the 
Nixon Administration and the heavy regulation of airlines. So Figure 1, with which I 
started this short paper, may still be a good indicator of the future of the system. 
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Footnotes:
                                                 
1  Taken from a House of Commons speech on November 11, 1947. 
 
2 “What has been, that will be; what has been done, that will be done. Nothing is new 
under the sun”; Ecclesiastics (1, 9). 
3  These figures are reproduced from my NBER paper “The Mystery of Human Capital” 
(2007), published as a chapter in Smith, Mark and Ehrlich (2007).   
4 1 These statistics are taken from Maddison 2003. All figures are converted to 1990 U.S. 
dollars using the Geary Khamis Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) method. Similar graphs 
apply to other major European countries as well. For example the growth rates of GDP 
and GDP per capita (in parentheses) over the period 1850–2003—starting when the U.S. 
overtook other major European countries in per-capita GDP—were: 3.52 (1.83) for the 
U.S.; 1.98 (1.46) for the U.K.; 2.06 (1.72) for France; 2.31 (1.71) for Germany; 2.48 
(1.75) for Italy; 2.18 (1.82) for Spain. 
  
5  The shorter-term trends have been uneven for other major European countries. Over the 
period 1961–2003 the per-capita GDP growth rate in France and Italy were 0.21% and 
0.40% higher than in the U.S., respectively, while in Germany it was .14% lower. 
However, over 1976–2003, e.g., the U.S.’s per-capita GDP growth was 0.28% higher 
than France’s, 0.47% higher than Germany’s, and .06% higher than Italy’s. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of the U.S. and the U.K. Real GDP in Log Terms (1850–2003) 
 
Note: GDP data are converted to 1990 U.S. dollars using the Geary-Khamis Purchasing-Power-
Parity (PPP) method. Data for 1851–1859 and 1861–1869 are imputed.  
 
Source: Data from Maddison 2003. 
 20
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
18
50
18
57
18
64
18
71
18
78
18
85
18
92
18
99
19
06
19
13
19
20
19
27
19
34
19
41
19
48
19
55
19
62
19
69
19
76
19
83
19
90
19
97
UK US
Figure 2: Comparison of the US and the UK Real GDP Per Capita in Log Terms 
(1850-2003) 
 
Note: Per Capita GDP Data are converted to 1990 US Dollars using the Geary-Khamis 
Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) method. Data for 1851-1859 and 1861-1869 are imputed.  
 
Source: Maddison (2003) 
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